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. tL. Lifo. 209M. III Bank. Dee. 18, 1848.] 
H. T. KOOD, Appellant, 'V. ELlIER BELT, Bespcmdent. 
(la.lb] J'bafcfaD&-JIalpractl __ ~":"In a malpractice 
ease, although an infection appearecl in plainti1r8 ariDary 
traet 24 h01l1'l afta!' a eyatoaeopic namination eondueted by 
defendant failed to diacloae &rr1 infection, an iDatruction 
,h'en at defendant's request that hie neglicence eould Dot be 
preaumed but must be baaed on apert testimon)", and an in-
struotion pven at plainti.1f'8 request that if it be found that 
plaintiff II1I8tained an in.Jary as the result of defendant's in-
troduction of a DeW infection an inference &rose that the 
proximate cause. of the injury " .. lOme Deglicence or mal-
praetice on the part of defenWmt "hich it ".. iDC1UDbent 
on him to rebut, "ere not GOntracJictory and it eould not be 
&aid that the jury".. th'U'8by misled to plaintir8 prejudice, 
"here the evidence on the iaaue of causation of the injury 
... eon1licting. 
[I] IcL-JIalpracU __ Iutructlona.-In a malpraeti\AI ease, it·" .. 
.JlOt error to refuse an inatruetion requested by plaintiff that 
upert testimony" .. not reqllirec1 to eatab1iab a fact baaed 
en eommon Jmowledce that danpr ".. involved in makinc 
a eyatoaeopio examination withcut FOper aterilisation of the 
instruments, "here the inference that an !Djuryresultinc 
from an infection in plaintift's urinary tract ".. not caused 
by defendant, but from lOme aouree theretofore mating in 
plainti1rs 7Btem, ..... not remote but eould be drawn from 
substantial evidence in the oaae, and "here plaintitr failed to 
eliminate himself .. a prozimate cause of . the inj147. 
(8] IcL - JIalpractice - Bviclence--OpiDloD Bvldence.-A medical 
expeJ"t is not qualifted .. a witneaa weaa he is ahOWII not 
[8] See 20 Oal.Jur. 1081; 41 Am.Jur. 240. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1,2] PhysiciaDs, 159; [8] PhY8icians, 
156(2); [4] Evidenee,§455i [5] Evidenee,IMOi [6] Appeal and 
Error, IlMS-L 
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only to have the required professional Jmowledge, learning 
.kill to apress his opinion, but is also familiar with the 
ards required of physieia,nll under .imiJar cireumtitances. 
[4] Evidence - Opinion Evidenre - QualiflcatioDl of Expert 
neues.-A party is entitled to examine an expert 
to his qualifications and experience eo that thetull _!ilrh'tl 
to be accorded his testimony will become apparen~. . 
{5] I4.-Opiniu E'ficlence-Bnmination of Witn ...... -In • 
practice ease, the trial court did not unduly limit plaintir.11 
examination of his upert witness by excludiDg JlYl)OtJllet1tsaQ 
questions' as to his Imowledge of exiating atandards in 
practice of urology, b'at permitting one hypothetical qUIIII"CIIIJJ 
as to the eause Of the infection .in plaiDti1r. .uiDary 
where the witness had practiced as an autopsy surgeon 
di..: Dot practice urology and did not bow the methoc1a 
practice in the diagnc.stic or treatment Selda, and where 
did not appear that further examination, either .. to 
qualiflcatioDl or his opinion of theeause of the mrection,1 
would have accorded greater weight to his testimony. 
[8] Appeal-Barmless and Prejudicial Brror-BuliDp .. to 
M888&-In a malpractice ease, plainti1r could not CODlplliLiJal 
of prejudice by reason of thJ eourt's refuaal k permit an 
pert witness to explain his "yes" &DBwer to the question 
whether his opinion on the hypothetical ease usumed compe-
tent manipulation of instruments in the eyatoacopic 8UJ!)jna.. 
tion conducted by defendant, where an ezplanation of the an-
ner was not Deceuary in view of the fact that the court 
properly ruled that the witness was not quali8ed to give . 
opinion concemiDgthe' exiBtiDg .tandarda in the practice 
urology. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Angeles County. William S. Baird" Judge. Aftirmed. 
Action for damages for malpraCtice. Judgment for QCU:encl-. 
ant affirmed. 
E. Briggs Howarth and Walter R. 'l'rinkaWl for Appellant. ' 
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter " Baltbis 88 Amici Curiae OIl 
behalf of Appellant. 
Fulcher" W)'DJl, Gibson, Dmm " Crutcher and Phillip O. 
Sterry for Respondent. 
Hartley F. Peart, GWI L. Baraty, Boward Bassard, George 
A.Smith, Alan L. Bonnington, Reed" Kirtland and Louis I. 
Regan 88 Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondem. 
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SHENK, J.-Appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment on a 
verdict for the defendant in an action to recover damages for 
alleged malpractice. The appeal is on a 8ettled statement. 
Due to an admitted con1Uct in the testimony it is not contended 
that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. The 
plaintiff'. principal assignments are that the court committed 
prejudicial error in the instrUctions on the issue of negligence 
and in rulings on the admiBBion of evidence. 
The defendant is a physician practicing in the county of 
Los Angeles and hasapecialized in urology lince 1923. The 
plaintiff, an attorney, is 46 years old and resides in Loa An-
geles. He formerly Uvedin Tens. On June 7, 1944, he ap-
peared at the defendant'a office. pursuant to an appointment. 
His medical history given at that time showed the foDowing: 
In childhood he experienced the usual ehildren'a diseases. 
In his youth he had troublt> withhia left testicle which was 
!IImalJ and would draw up into the abdomen upon pressure. 
This condition continut>d throughout the years causing him 
pain and discomfort. Beginning about 1920 a sinus infection 
developed which gave him much distress. Drainages in 1921 
quieted the area somewhat until 1930. The difliculty recurred 
and in 1932 he had a bone cutting operation which did not 
entirely remove the trouble. At times he had a alight rheu-
matic pain in the right wrist. Periodic pain centering in the 
lower abdominal region commenced about 1936. It was pre-
ceded by a alight nonvenereal urethral diaeharge which dis-
appeared after treatment. X-ray and ftuoroaeopic examina-
tions were made in El Paso and again in 1939 in Los Angeles 
.: in an attempt to locate the ·origin of the abdominal pain, and 
1 in 1942 the appendix was removed. But the diflieulty re-
mained and called for further study. For this purpose the 
plaintiff was sent by his personal physician to the defendant. 
At the defendant'a oflice the plaintiff was subjected to exami-
nation and testa of the prostatic· secretion, the urine, and for 
syphilis. Be was then prepared for cystoscopic examination 
which was conducted by the defendant with the use of instru-
ments and ftuids inaerted through the ureters. X-ray pictures 
were taken. Before he departed the plaintiff was informed by 
the defendant that the tests showed negative results except 
for five per cent pus cells in the prostatic secretion which 
was stated to be normal, and that his trouble could not be 
traced to any infeetionor difliculty in the genito-urinary 
system. 
, -.~./ 
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'!'he plaiDtUf worked. at his oftlce the following day .,ud eve.; 
aing until 8 o'clock when he had a chill and 'went home. ~ 
and fever continued alternately throughout the night and the 
nut day. The defendant was out of the city and the plainti1r) 
called Dr. Hyde who took aamples of urine·to his laborato17 
for testa and later reported the results which were not given', 
in evidence. Sulfa drup were aent from the defendant'. office . 
. for administration. The following day Dr. Guth of the de-
fendant's staff called, made examinations and advised con-' 
tinuing the drup. ChDla and profuse neating continued.' 
and the plaintUf was taken to a hospital where he was at-
tended by Dr. Ebert from the defendant's oftlce. Dr. Ebert 
informed the plaintiff that he was being treated for an acute i 
infection of the urinary paasagea but it was not understood 
how the infection arose. The ehills and fever abated on June~ 
14th and on June 16th the plaintiff returned to his home 
where he was eonftned for 10 days. On June 27th, be reported . 
at the defendant's oftlce and after prostatic and urinary testa ": 
was told he had a 95 per cent infection. Subsequent testa. 
showed the infection decreasing gradually to 10 per cent. Be·.·. 
was informed that the defendant did not mow the cause of . 
the infection. The plaintiff then began treatment with his':. 
personal physician. Because of an apparent allergy to sulfa '._ 
drup, penicillin was substituted in the treatment and appar- ; 
ent1y proved more effective. ~ 
On the trial the plainti1f produced one expert witness, an . 
autopsy surgeon in Loa Angeles, who testified that in his opin- :. 
Ion the 24 hours between the cystoscopic examination and the' 
fever symptoms conatituted an incubation period for bacteria 
introduced into the delicate channels by unsterile instruments : 
or, assuming proper aterilizationof the' instruments, from the 
opening of the channels whose edges were not thoroughly 
cleansed; that the results showed a well-aeated infection in the ' 
urinary tract which was not present prior to instrumentation. -
Witnesses produced by the defendant testified eoneemiDg 
standards of treatment and sterilization methods and stated 
tbat in their opinion the infection was not eaused by any 
unsterile preparatory procedure nor introduced from outside ~ 
sources in the conduct of the eystoseopic examination but, 
baaed on the prior medical history, was attributable to low-
grade chronic infection in the genito-urinary traeta, probably 
prostatic in origin, or to the use of sulfa drugs, or to in1iuenza 
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At the defendant'sreqnest the court charged the jury in 
,tmbetance that the defendant's negligence could n,ot be pre-
aumed but must be based on the testimony of operts;' also 
that the jury could not set up a standard but must be governed 
eolely by the testimony of expert witnesses. 
The plainti1f requested an instruction (based 0Ji B.A.J.I. 
214-B Pocket Parts) embodying the substance of the fore-
going instructions and adding that expert testimony was not 
required to establish a faet based on common knowledge that 
danger is involved where eertainpreeautioD8.!)' measures in-
'«ucting sterilization are not followed, ''Where1ipon ,whether the 
:4Ondition was caused by negligenee may bedecnded in the ligh't 
'of snch common knowledge. ''The requested' instruction was 
refused but at the plaintiff's request the jury 'was charged 
that if it be found that the plainti1f 'sustained injury as the 
:result of the introduction by the defendant of a' new infection, 
an inferenee arose that the proximate cause of the injury was 
eome negligenee or malpractice on the part of the defendant 
which it was incumbent npon him to rebut by clear, positive 
and uncontradicted evidence that the injury oeeurred without 
any faUure of duty on hill part. " 
[la] The plaintiff contends that the instructions given were 
-eGnfticting and confused the jury; that the correct theory 
of the ease is that as a matter of common knowledge the result 
does not usually, happen when sterilization has been proper; 
that expert testimony was not required to prove negligenCe; 
therefore that the instructions in conftietwith, ~ theory 
,were erroneous, misleading and prejudieiat ' , 
On the other hand the defendant, supported by state ana 
county medical assoeiations as amici curiae, questions the pro-
priety of any application of a ,doctrine based on common 
knowledge in the absenee of the fact first established without 
conflict that the infeetion was introdueed by the act of the 
defendant. It is therefore contended that the reeor<} presents 
issues of fact solely within the knowledge of aperts and that 
the plaintiff's given instruction which incorporated a statement 
of the res ipsa loquitur doetrine was more favorable to him 
than the record warranted. ' 
The given instruetions embodied a atatement of the general 
rule that the proper and usual practiee in diagnosis and treat-
ment is a question for experts and can be established only by 
their testimony. (PerlriftB v, Tn,eblood, 180 Cal. 437, 443 
[181 P. 642]), and the exception declared in Btlrkm v. Wid-
) 
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"g, 210 Cal. 206 [291 P. 173], and other cases relied on b 
the plaintift. 
In BarhGm v . Widing the defendant extracted a tooth fro 
the plaintift's jaw. An infection developed which from th 
evidence could be traced to the use of an UIl8terile bypodermi 
needle or solution inserted to anaesthetize the jaw. The ju 
was instructed that if the defendant 'used an unsterile needl 
()r solution which proximately caused the infection the plain-
tiff should recover. It was claimed that the omission of the 
words "carelessly and negligently" was prejudicial error. 
This court aftirmed the judgment entered on the verdict for 
the plaintift and determined that the mere fact of infection 
following and traceable to improper sterilization was evidence 
of carelessness and negligence; that the court would take 
judicial notice that in common knowledgl' such a result does 
not follow proper sterilization and that observance of the 
.ordinary standards would preclude tht> oat> of an unsterile 
needle or solution; therefore the omitted words were not nee-
essary to a proper charge. 
Declarations to similar effect and variously stated have been 
applied in many situations. (Diermaft v. Prtwidence H olpital, 
31 Cal.2d 290 [188 P.2d 12] ; Yba"a v. Spafigard, 25 Cal.2d 
.486,489 [1M P.2d 687,162 A.L.R. 1258]; Lawl", v. Calaway, i 
24 Cal.2d 81, 86 [147 P.2d 604] ; Belland. v. Park Sanitarium 
bm.,214 Cal. 472,480 [6 P.2d 508] ; Meyer v. McNutt BOI-
pital, 173 Cal. 156 {159 P. 436] ; Dean v. Dyer,64 Cal.App.2d 
646,658 [149 P.2d 288] ; Mastro v. Kennedy, 57 Cal.App.2d 
499, 504 [134 P.2d 865]; WGlter v. England, 133 Ca1.App. 
676, 680 [24 P.2d 930]; ItKlerbiben v. Lane Hospital. 124 
Cal.App. 462, 467 [12 P.2d '144, 18 P.2d 905].) . In other i 
cases the doctrine bas been recognized. (Sins v. Owem, 38 I 
Cal.2d 749, '158 [205 P.2d 3] ; Bngelking v. Caru01l .. 13 Cal.2d 
216, 221 [88 P.2d 695] and cases cited; Ch'lrck v. Blnch, 80 
Cal.App.2d 542, 548-M9 [182 P.2d 241]; Riring v. Veatch, 
117 Cal.App. 404, 408 [8 P.2d 1023] ; Donahoo v. Louas, 105 
Cal.App. '105, '109 [288 P. 6981.) 
[2] In the eases cited where the doctrine was beld appli-
cable evidence that tht> defendant did not cauSl' tbt> injury 
was remote and it followed as a matter of common knowledge 
from the nature of the injury that tbe result would not hap. 
pen without carelessness or negligence. In tbt' present C8SP 
the inference that the injury was Dot caused by tbt> defend-
ant, but from some source theretofoTP t'Xisting in th~ plaintiff's 
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evidence in the record. On the evidence of the plainti«'. 
medical history the jury was not required to but could reason-
ably conclude that the prior infection, and not any negligent 
act on the part of the defendant, was the proximate cause of 
the trouble. The inference based on common knowledge is at 
the root of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Before it eould be 
drawn under the facts of this case the jury would have to 
reject the hypothesis that the plaintiff's prior condition was 
the proximate cause. (Prosser, Torts, p. 295; Prosser, arti-
cle Be. Ip.a Loquitur in CaU{omf.tJ, 37 CaI.L.Rev. '183, 
201; Yba"a v. 8pt1ngud, ,,"pra, 25 Cal.2d atp. ~9.) 
Omitted from the plaintiff's refused instruction but included 
in his given instruction covering the rea ipsa loquitur doctrine, 
is the necessary element of causal connection between the act 
and the injury. [lb] An instruction based on the plaintiff'. 
theory that the exception only Bhouldbe applied would re-
solve in his favor the issue of causation and thereby take that 
question from the jury's consideration. The evidence on that 
issue was conflicting and the court correctly aubmittE'd the case 
to the jury with the inclusion of the element of causation, 
thereby calling for statements of both the general rule and 
the exception. (See Ba,.ham v. Widing, ,,"pra, 210 Cal. at 
p. 216; Nellon v. Paints" ·Parke,., 104 Cal.App. '170. '175 
[286 P. 1078].) Since there was no real contradiction as to 
the applicable theories, it may not be said that the jury was 
misled to the prejudice of the plaintiff on a record of con-
flicting evidence containing snbstantialeupport for the jury's 
verdict, and this court is therefore not at liberty to disturb 
the result of the jury'. deliberations. 
It is urged that the trial court unduly limited the plaintiJf'. 
examination of his expert witness. It appeared from the tea-li 
timony of. this witness that he had practiced as an autopsy 
surgeon for 29 years. that be did not practice urology, did 
not conduct genito-urinary examinations in the diagnostic !! 
or treatment flelds, and did not know the method. of practice 
therein, but that he bad learning and knowledge of the anat-
omy and of infections in TE'lation to thE' genito-urinary system. 
When this testimony was given and after consultation and 
offers of proof in chambE'rs. the court excluded hypothetical 
questions addressed to this witness based on his knowledge of 
the existing standards in the practice of urology, hut permit-
ted one hypothetical question to elicit the witness' opinion as 
to the cause of the infection. 
/ 
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[3] A medical expert is not qualified as a. witness unless 
he is shown not only to have the required professional knowl-
edge, learning and skill to express his opinion, but is also 
familiar with the standards required of physicians under simi-
lar circumstances. (Sinz 'I. Owens, supra, 33 Ca1.2d at p. 753 
et seq.) [4] A party is entitled to examine an expert wit-
ness as to his qualifications and experience so that the full 
weight to be accorded his testimony will become apparent. 
(Salmon v. Ratkjens, 152 Cal. 290, 299 (92 P. 733].) [5] But 
in view of the witness' admitted lack of practice in urology 
the extent of the examination as to his qualifications in rela-
tion to the subject matter of his opinion was within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. (Sins v. Owens, supra, 33 Cal. 
2d at p. 753.) The witness gave a chronological account of 
his education and experience and demonstrated his anatoinical 
knowledge as it related to the genito-urinary system. It does 
not appear that further examination either as to his qualifi-
cations or his opinion of the cause of infection would have 
accorded any greater weight to his testimony. The plaintiff 
was not unduly restricted on direct or rebuttal examination 
by rulings sustaining objections to further hypothetical ques-
tions which were repetitions of the question answered by the 
witness and to questions on subjects not within the limits 
of the witness' qualifications as determined by the court. 
[6] Likewise the plaintiff may not complain of prejudice by 
reason of the court's refusal to permit the witness to explain 
his "yes" answer to the question whether his opinion on the 
hypothetical case assumed competent manipulation of instru-
ments in the examination conducted by the defendant. Inas-
much as the court properly ruled that the witness was not 
qualified to give his opinion concerning the existing standards 
in the practice of urology, an explanation of ,the answer was 
not necessary. No prejudicial error or abuse of discretion is 
shown. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. I cannot agree with either the 
result or the reasoning of the majority opinion. This case 
. was ably and correctly disposed of by the opinion of Justice 
Vallee in the District Court of Appeal, and with some ad-
ditions and deletions, I adopt that opinion as follows (90 
A.C.A. 248): 
) 
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" Appellant '. usignments of error are: (1) the court 
erred in giving instructions ,requested by respondent and in 
refusing to give instructions requested by appellant, (2) the 
court erred in 81IStaining objections to questions asked the 
expert called by appellant for the purpose of establishing 
his qualifications, in 8U8taining objeCtions to hypothetical 
questions asked the expert, in not permittiDg him to explain 
a 'Yes' answer, and in SUBtaining objections to iJuestions 
asked him on rebuttal which a.umed faeta developed by the 
defense. 
, "The evidence germane to 'the ilrtt UBignmeJltof 'error 
will be related. Appellant went to Dr. Belt'. ofBce on June '1, 
1944, for a cystoscopic examination. At the time be 'was • 
man 41 years of age. After giving ·the ·aoctor a hiStory, he 
was partially disrobed, the doctor palpated his abdomen 
and examined· his testicles. He was then 1aken to another 
room for further examinations and tests preparatory to the 
cystoscopic examination. Be was disrobed and clothed with 
a BlU'gical gown. His pulse and temperature were taken. A 
test was made of his hemoglobin. His lungs and teeth were 
examined. . Samples of his urine were taken, tested and found 
negative. His blood pressure was taken. A syphilis test was 
made. It was negative. A prostatic ID8SIJ8ge was performed 
and a sample taken of the prostatic aecretion. 
"After a wait, appellant was taken toa cystosCopic exami-
nation room and assi.Bted onto a table. The table was 80' con-
atructed that he could be turned from a prone position to· an 
erect standing position without being removed from the table. 
While on the table appellant could not lee and did not know 
what was being done except what he could feel. A layman, 
called a technician, 26 years of age, in the absence of Dr. Belt, 
prepared appellant for instrumentation. '!'he layman picked 
up a tray from a nune in the next room. .,he tray contained 
an installator, swab, water tube, two syringes, a peroneal 
towel and a sheet. He washed appellant'a male organ, 
injected an anesthetic therein and inserted a *.inch stopper 
to hold the anesthetic in place. Dr. Belt took a cystoBcope 
from a tray in another room and went into the examination 
room. A . eystoBcope is an instrument about twice the length 
of a fountain pen, with a diameter smaller than a fountain 
pen, made of copper and nickel plated, with the end turned up 
and a hollow ahaft. It was lubricated with a non-oily lubri-
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the cystoscope into the opening, inserted it th;rough the 
organ into the bladder and observed· the interior of the 
bladder. The ureter openings into the bladder and the interior 
of the bladder appeared normal in every respect. Catheters 
were inserted through the cystoscope into the bladder through 
both renal pelves and pushed through the ureter to the 
kidneys. The catheters had been threaded into the cystoscope 
by someone not named in the evidence. A specimen of urine 
was collected through the catheters into test tubes and when 
examined it was found that there was no bacteria or pus 
present. A dye solution was injected into each uretral catheter 
and X-rays taken while appellant was in a prone position and 
also while he was in a standing position and while instruments 
remained in his body. The catheters were withdrawn and the 
solution remaining in the ureter was allowed to trail to the 
bladder as far as the prostate level and X-ray pictures taken 
of the area. All X-ray pictures were negative. 
"Dr. Belt testified that: the examination sho-wed appeUant's 
urinary tract from the kidney.~ down to the prostate was in a 
normal condition; it was a textbook picture of normalcy; after 
the examination he told appellant that his ge1l1:to-urinary sys-
tem was negative. He testifipd that fever which develops an 
unusual time after a cystoscopic examination is not thenormal 
reaction therefrom. Dr. Belt told appellant that if any reac-
tion occurred at all it would ~)ccurwithin two hours. He also 
told him that the examination was entirely negative, that the 
blood count, hemoglobin. beart pulse and respiration were 
normal. Dr. Belt told him that his prostate, prostatic secre-
tion and urine were normal, that his prostate was normal in 
size, shape and consistency, that his bladder was normal, that 
both his prostate and bladder were negative ~ to any patho-
logical condition, that his kidneys and ureters were normal, 
that he was a textbook picture of perfection. 
"About 24 hours later-4 o'clock the next day-appellant 
began feeling odd. He began baving chills about 8 o'clock 
that night. He had chills and fever all night and all the next 
day. June 9. On June 10. he received some medicines from 
Dr. Belt's office which he understood were sulfa drugs. He 
started to take the sulfa drugs the afternoon of June 10. He 
continued to have chills and fever on June 10 and 11. On 
June 11, Dr. Gnth. an assistant of Dr. Belt, went to appel-
lant's home, examined bim and told him to continue taking 
the medicine. A PPE-Hant continllf'rl to have alternate chills 
and fever. His temperature became progressively higher, ru.n-
r 
I 
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Ding to 105 degrees about 10 p. m. on June 11. He was then 
taken to a hospital on the advice of Dr. Belt's assistant. The 
ehills and fever continued. The sulfa drugs were diseontin-
ued on June 13 at 2 :30 p. m. but the fever and ehills pe1'listed 
until June 14. Be remained in the hospital until the after-
l100n of June 16. 
"While in the hospital appellant was attended by Dr. Ebert, 
another assistant of Dr. Belt. Appellant, while in the hospi-
ia1, asked Dr. Ebert what was causing 1u 16t1ef" elm. .tad 
ligh litlef'. Dr. Ebert replied, 'That's hard to 1&1. Btllf'f/one 
BOtOs flO. loti' •• OCfI.f, -fecfioA of lie .rlMt'fI poISGg", 
but I e&D't understand how it got there. But that is why you 
are being given the sulfa drugs and pyridium.These medi-
emes are for infectionS of that kind." Dr. Ebert, although 
still in the employ of Dr. Belt, was not ea1led as a witness. 
"On June 27, when appellant was able to leave his home 
for the first time, he went to Dr. Belt's office. Be was given 
a prostatic massage by Dr. Guth and samples of his urine were 
taken for tests. After the tests were completed, he asked Dr. I 
Guth the results. Dr. Guth told him that the tests showed 
that he atill had a 25 per cent infection. Appellant was 
gil'en prostatic massages by Dr. Guth until July 28, 1944. On 
each oeeasion Dr. Guth told him that he had an infection pres-
ent in the urinary tract but that the amount was gradually de-
ereasing 80 that at the time of his last visit the test ahowed 
only 10 per cent. Dr. Belt was away from Los Angeles from 
June 9 to June 23. Sometime thereafter and while Dr. Guth 
was giving appellant a prostatic massage, Dr. Belt appeared 
and appellant said, 'Dr. Belt, Dr. Guth just told me that I 
atill hal'e 10% infection present. I didn't have ImY infection 
when I came in here in June and J don't see why I should 
have any now.' Dr. Belt replied that 10 per cent was within 
normal limits. Appellant then asked Dr. Belt what had caused 
the infection in the urb1ar1 tract and the severe chills and 
high fever. Dr. Belt replied, 'To tell the truth, 1 don't know.' 
Dr. Belt did not deny having made this answer to appellant's 
query. Dr. Guth was in Wisconsin at the time of the trial. 
His deposition was not taken. 
"The expert called by appellant testified that the 24 hours 
between the time of the examination and the time appellant 
began to have chills and fever probably was an incubation 
period for bacteria introduced into the urinary tract in the 
preparation for, or in the making of the examination, that 
_" .,....;:$0... ~. 
536 MOORE v. BELT [34 C.2d 
the introduction was evidently due to some defective condition 
of the instruments or carrying in from' the opening of' the 
meatus (the canal in the male organ), whose edges were not 
thoroughly cleansed, and that the treatment given in the 
hospital was for an infection of the urinary tract. 
"As we read the record, there is no evidence that either the 
stopper or the cystoscope or the catheters used in the exami-
nation were sterilized before insertion into appellant's body. 
Neither the lay technician nor Dr. Belt sterilized anyone of 
them or saw anyone of them sterilized. No one testified that 
~e sterilized anyone of them. On the other hand, there is no 
direct evidence that they were not sterilized . 
.. Appellant's contention is stated in his brief. He says, 
• (a) His genito-urinary system was in a healthy and normal 
condition on June 7,1944, when he reported to respondent for 
a urological examination, every part of that system beine 
free of infection of every kind and description. This was es-
tablished by the records and testimony of respondent which 
showed that immediately prior to the cystoscopic examination 
and on the same date appellant was given various tests, in-
cluding tests of his urine, prostatic secretion, blood etc., all of 
which were negative and showed no infection present and, 
further, that the urological examination disclosed appellant's 
genito-urinary system to be in a healthy and normal condi-
tion. (b) About 24 hours after the cystoscopic examination 
had been completed by respondent, symptoms appeared show-
ing that an infection had developed which the evidence estab-
lished was within the confines of appellant's genito-urinary 
system. Appellant testified to the appearance of such symp-
toms approximately 24 h.ours after the examination. It was 
shown that 24 hours was the normal incubation period for Ii 
new infection of this type. And the fact that such infection 
which did not exist immediately before the examination, did 
-exist approximately 24 hours after the examination, was es-
tablished by the uncontradicted admissions of respondent and 
his assistants, by the nature of the treatment given, and also 
by expert testimony offered through Dr. Webb. (c) This in-
fection had been caused by infectious matter which had been 
.carried into appellant's urinary tract during the urological 
examination. Proof of (a) and (b) give rise to this inference 
which is further and directly established by the expert testi-
.mony of Dr. Webb. Cd) There was no issue raised regarding 
the professional skill or learning of the respondent. (e) The 
question involved was whether respondent or his employees or 
f 
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assistants were negligent in failing to effect and maintain 
proper sterilization for such examination. This negligence 
was established as a question of fact by proof of (a), (b), and 
(c), onder the principles of Barham v. Widi7lg, 210 Cal. 206 
{291 P. 173], and also by the inference of such negligence 
arising under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as announced 
in Yba,.,.a v. 8pangard, 25 Cal.2d 486 {1M P.2d 687, 162 
A.L.R. 1258].' 
"The evidence which has been related puts the case squarely 
within the doctrine of Barham v. Widing. 210 Cal. 206 [291 P. 
173]. In that ease the defendant, a licensed dentist, extracted, 
the left lower molar tooth of the plaintift'. In order to operate 
a local anesthetic was administered by means of a hypodermic 
injection of novocaine. The needle was twice inserted in the 
gum of plaintiff at a point over the ramus or ascending prong 
of the left lower jawbone near' the diseased tooth. After five 
or six days an infection of the gum and jaw developed. A 
physician testified that the locality of the primary infection 
was the point where the hypodermic needle had been inserted 
in the gum, that it 'was the center of the abscess; it was deep, 
very deep, so that it must have been necessary that the infec-
tion was introduced . . . on a needle, or perhaps an unsterile 
solution, because the pus was found very, very deep,' imd that 
from his examination of the socket from which the tooth had 
been removed the socket was not the seat of the infection. The 
plaintift' had judgment. On appeal the defendanteontended 
that • the judgment is not supported' by the evidence since 
there is a total absence of medical expert testimony to the 
eRect that the operation and treatment of the patient in the 
emacting of the tooth did not eonform to the standard &Co 
~pted method of the profession in that vicinity , 
"In affirming the judgment the court stated, page 213: 
'The appellant asserts that the evidence is uot sufficient to 
establish negligence on his part because there is no direct 
testimony that the needle or solution which was used in ad-
ministering the anesthetic was unsterile; that a dentist, like a 
physician, is required to have and use only the degree of 
learning and skin which is ordinarily possessed by the den-
tists of good professional reputation in that locality. This is 
the rule with respect to physicians. (Buler v. California 
Bospital Co., 178 Cal. 764 [174 P. 654].) Undoubtedly the 
same rule applies to dentists. The jury was cltarly instructed 
to this effect. It is equally true that cases which depend upon 
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knowledge of the scientific effect of medicme, or the-result of 
surgery, must ordinarily be established by expert testimony of 
physicians and surgeons. (Perkins v. Trueblood, 180 Cal. 437 
[181 P. 642].) This rule, however, applies only to such facts 
as are peculiarly within the knowledge of such _professional 
experts and not to facts which may be ascertained by the ordi-
nary use of the senses of a nonexpert ... [p.214.] The judg-
ment in this case must be supported, if at all, upon the theory 
of appellant's negligence in failing to sterilize his hypodermic 
needle and the mouth and gum of the patient before perform-
ing the operation of extracting the tooth. It is true that both 
the dentist and his nurse testified that the usual process of 
sterilization was followed. It is equally true that there is no 
direct evidence that he failed to sterilize either the needle or 
the surface of the flesh where it was inserted. Barham does 
state that he did not remember that the dentist sterilized his 
mouth or gum. 
" 'Under the circumstances of this case there is a remote 
possibility that the infection developed from some cause other 
than the defendant's failure to sterilize the needle or the gum 
into which it was inserted, but the evidence is sufficient upon 
which to warrant the jury in finding that it was caused by his 
negligence in failing to follow these reasonable precautions in 
spite of his testimony to the contrary. The jurors were entitled 
to accept the solution to which these circumstances led them, in 
preference. even. to the positive statements of the defendant 
and his nurse to the contrary. After the verdict of a jury 
has been fairly rendered, all the circumstances of the case, 
together with every reasonable inference which may be drawn 
therefrom, will be marshalled in support of the judgment. 
Because of the very subtleness of the origin and development 
of disease, less certainty is required in proof thereof. As the 
court says in the case of Dimock v. Miller, 202 Cal. 668, 671 
[262 P. 311, 312] : 
" • .. If . . . it is necessary to demonstrate conclusively and 
beyond the possibility of a doubt that the negligence resultcd 
in the injury, it would never be possible to recover in a case 
of negligence in the practice of a profession which is not an 
exact science." . 
.. 'It is not necessary in the trial of civil cases that the cir-
cumstances shall establish the negligence of the defendant as 
the proximate cause of injury with such absolute certainty as 
to exclude every other cOllclusion . • • 
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.. 'In this 'ease no question is raised regarding the pro-
fessional skill of the dentist. It is conceded that he was rea-
sonably learned and skilful in his profession. But it is as-
serted that he was negligent in failing to sterilize the hypo-
dermic needle and the gum into which he inserted the instru-
ment. There is no conflict regarding the fact that infection 
of the jaw caused the injuries to Barham. It is conclusive 
that this infection developed within a few days after the opera~ 
tion on the ramus of the jaw at just the point where the needle 
was inserted, and nof in the socket from which the tooth had 
been removed . . . 
41 '[p. 216.} It was not necessary for any dentist or physi-
cian to state that the conduct of the defendant was, negligent 
or in confiict with the usual established practice of the pro-
fession in that vicinity to administer a local anesthetic for 
the purpose of extracting a tooth without sterilizing the needle, 
or the flesh into which it is inserted. 'The court will take judi-
cial knowledge of the necessity to use ordinary Care 'to pro-
cure sterilization under such circumstances. This ease was 
tried upon the theory that everyone concerned' 'recogriized 
this duty. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the evidence 
will support the judgment in this regard. ' . (See, also, M Co 
Bride v. Sayli'JI, 6 Cal.2d 134 [56 P.2d 941] ; lnderbit.en v. 
Lane Hospital, 124 Cal.App. 462 (12 P.2d 744, 13 P.2d ~(j5] ; 
Thomsen v. BurgesOfl., 26 Cal.App.2d 235 [79 P.2d 136]; 
AndersOfl. v. Stump, 42 Cal.App.2d761 [109 P.2d '1027]; 
Mastro v. Kennedy, 57 Ca1.App.2d 499, 504 [134 P.2d 865] ; 
Dean v. Dyer, 64 Cal.App.2d 646 [149 P.2d 288); CZemefll v. 
Smith, 170 Ore. 400 [134 P.2d 424]; DrtJkes v. TullocA, 220 
Mass. 256 [108 N.E. 9161 ; Hafemann v. SBflmM', 195 Wis. 625 
[219 N.W. 375]; S1OafllOfl. v. Hood, 99 Wash. 506 [170 P. 
135,137).) 
"In the Barham ease a physician testified as an expert not 
that the conduct of the dentist was negligent or in confiict with 
the degree of care and skill ordinarily exercised by dentists 
in that vicinity, but simply to establish that the infection in 
the plaintiff's jaw was caused by an unsterile hypodermic 
needle or by an nnsterile solution. In the ease at bar appellant's 
expert.testified merely for the purpose of establishing that the 
infection in appellant's urinary tract was caused by an un-
sterile instrument or that the parts of appellant's body intol 
and through which the instruments were inserted had Dot 
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"'l'hpre is no difference between the facts of the Barham 
cast' and the farts of the case at 'bar In the Barham case a 
needle was inserted into the gum and a solution injected. Five 
or si~ days later an infection appeared. The point of infec-
tion was the place where the needle was inserted. It was held 
that, without expert testimony, the jury could infer negligence. 
lIere, instruments were inserted into the male organ and the 
urinary tract and a solution injected. Twenty-four hours 
later an infection appeared. The point of infection was the 
urinary tract. The jury, without expert testimony, could infer 
negligence. The evidence in the present case makes for a. 
stronger inference of negligence than that in the Barham case. 
In that case there was nQ evidence that the gum was not in-
fected at the time the needle was inserted and the solution in-, 
jected. Here the evidence-with the exception of the opinions 
of two defense experts which were contrary to the testimony 
of Dr. Belt that appellant's gellito-urinary system was nega-
tive-is without conflict that the urinary tract was in a Jiealthy 
and normal condition and free from infection at the time the 
instruments were inserted and the solution injected. In the 
Barham case the infection did uot appear until five or six days 
after the operation. Here the infection appeared about 24 
hours after the examination. 
"With the evidence stated before the jury, the court at 
the request of respondent gave the following- instructions: 
(1) 'Negligence upon the part ~f a physician is neve,., to be 
presumed, and in the absence of expert testimony to the con,-
trary, it is to be presumed that a physician possesses and has 
exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in examining 
a patient.' (2) 'In determining the question of whether the 
defendant was guilty of negligence as alleged in the complaint 
you tallnot and must not set up a standard of your own but 
. must be governed in that regard solely by the testimony of 
expert witnesses who have appeared and testified in this case.' 
Under these instructions the jury was not permitted to deter-
mine for themselves that failure to properly sterilize the in-
struments inserted into the appellant's body or failur(' to 
properly sterilize the parts of the body through which the 
instruments were in!\erted, or both, was negligence. Failure 
on the part of a physician in either of these respects is neg-
li~ellce as a matter of common knowledge. There is no law, 
as applied to the facts of this case, which requires that the 
jury in determining these questions be governed solely by the 
tsetimony of expert witnesses. The practical effect of theSfl 
) 
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instructions W88 to direct the jury to return a verdict for the 
respondent . . . . 
.. The court refused to give the following instructions re-
quested by appellant: (1) 'In deterruiningwhether defend-
ant's learning, skill and conduct fulfilled the duties imposed 
on him by law. 88 they have been stated to you, you are not 
permitted to set up arbitrarily a standard of your own. The 
standard, I remind you, was set up by the learning, skill and 
care ordinarily possessed and practiced by others of tbe same 
profession iJi good standing, in the lame locality at the same 
time. It follows, therefore, that except 88 hereinafter u-
plained the only ~ay you may properly learn that standard, 
is through evidence presented in this trial by physicians and 
surgeons called 88 expert witnesses . 
.. 'However, there is this exception to the rule just stated: 
when it is a matter of common knowledge that danger is 
involved iJi certain conditions or iJi a failure to maintain cer-
tain conditions or to take certain precautionary measures, 88, 
for instance, failure to perform the commonly known duties 
of cleanliness or sterilization, expert testimony is not required 
to establish sucb a fact, but it may be judicially noticed 88 a 
part of that fund of common knowledge shared by us with our 
fellow citizens generally. 
" 'This exception may be otherwise stated 88 follows: When 
it is common knowledge that an event or a CircuDlStl111ce that 
has happened to or developed iJi a patient is of tbe kind that 
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence on the 
part of the physician attendiJig him, the question whether or 
not the condition W88 caused by negligence may be decided 
from the general circumstances 88 shown by the evidence and 
iJi the light of common experience and reason. t • •• • 
"(2) 'If you believe from the preponderance of the evidence 
that defendant, Elmer Belt, or any of his agents or employees, 
negligently used or employed either unsterilized instruments 
or solutions in the examination of the plaintiff or in the in-
jecting into him of such solutions and that 88 the proximate 
result thereof iJifection W88 introduced into plaintiff thereby 
injuring him, plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendant, 
Elmer Belt, his damages herein in 8uch sum as in your judg-
ment, considering aU of tbe evidence, will jURtly compensate 
him for any damage you believe him to hav(' sustained as the 
proximate result thereof.' In Picru v. Putl'rson, 50 Cal.App. 
2d 486, 489 [123 P.2d 544], the court quoted witb approval 
) 
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from Sim v. Weeks, 7 Cal.App.2d 28 [45 P.2d·350], as follows: 
, .. It is well settled that a physician and surgeon cannot be 
held to guarantee the results of his professional services. 
'However, it is equally well settled that in undertaking a 
treatment of a patient the practitioner impliedly contracts 
and represents not only that he possesses the reasonable degree 
of skill and learning possessed by others of his profession in 
the locality, but that he will use reasonable and ordinary care 
andskiZl in the application of s1wh knowledge to accompZish. 
the purpose for which he is employed; and that if injury is 
cBused by want of sllch skill or care on his part he is liable 
fOl' the consequences which follow. (Houghtonv. Dickson, 
29 Cal.App. 321 [155 P. 1281 ; Nelson v. Painless Parker. 104 
Cal.App. 770 [286 P. 1078 j ; Perkins v. 7'rueblood, 180 Cal. 
437 lI8I P. 642J ; Hesler v. Californta Hospital Co .• 178 Cal. 
764 [174 P. 654] ; Ley Y. Billhopp, 88 Cal.App. 313 [263 P. 
369j; Patterson Y. Marcus, 20;3 Cal. 550 [265 P. 222j.)" , 
(Italics added.) Appellant doe::; 110t contend that respondent 
did not have the rel[uisite knowledge and skill. His contention 
is that respondent was negligent in no proper sterilization. 
Where the evidence conflicts, each party is entitled to have the 
law given to the jury which is applicable to his theory of 
the case and the testimony of his witnesses. (KelZey v. City 
etc. of San Jt'rancisco, 58 Cal.App.2d 872, 876 [137 P .2d 719]; 
BllcHey v. Shell Chemical Co., Ltd., 32 Cal.App.2d 209, 216 
lim P.2d 4:>3J ; Dowdall v. Gilmore Oil Co., Ltd., 18 Cal.App. 
2d 1,5 l62 P.2d 1051J ; Renton, Hulmes d; Co. v. Monnier, 77 
Cal. H!J,455 [19 P. 820].) This injunction is not met when 
the instructions remove that theory from consideration of the 
jury. (Morrow v. MendZeson, 15 Ca1.App.2d 15, 21 [58 P.2d 
1302].) It is the duty of the court to give instructions ex-
pounding the law on every reasonable theory of the case find-
ing support in the evidence. (Megee v. FasuZis, 65 Cal.App. 
2d 94,101 [150 P.2d 2811.) 
.. The evidence, without the testimony of experts, was suffi-
cient to warrant the jury in finding that the infection was 
caused by the negligence of respondent. It was, therefore, 
prejudicial error to give the two instructions requested by 
respondent and to refuse to give the two instructions requested 
by appellant." 
The instructions that were given as above quoted unequivo-
cally removed the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur from the case. 
No other interpretation thereof is possible. The instruction 
which was given on that subject and upon which the majority 
/ 
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rely as curing the questioned instruetion, is not aceurate and 
could not have rt!1P.9ved the positive impression given to the 
jury by the erroneous instruetion. As phrased in the major-
ity opinion, it read: ". . . that if it be found that tht' plain-
tiff sustained injury as the result of the introduction by the 
defendant of a ne~ infection, an inference arose that the 
proximate cause of the injury was some negligence or mal-
practice on the part of the defendant which it was ineumbent 
upon him to rebut by clear, positive and uncontradicted evi-
dence that the injury occumd without any failure of duty on 
his part." The instruction given, in faet, reads: "If, and 
only in the event, you should find that plainti1f,R. T. MOOD, 
sustained injury as the result of the introduction by defend-
ant, ELMER BELT, or any of his agents or employees, ofa new 
infection you are instrueted as follows: An inferenee arises 
that the proximate cause of such injury was some negligence 
or malpraetice on the part of the defendant, ELMER BELT, 
or his agents or employees. That inference is a form of evi-
dence, and if there is none other tending to overthrow it, or 
if the inference preponderates over contrary evidenee, it war-
rants a verdict in favor of plainti1f. Therefore. you should 
weigh any evidence tending to overcome that inference, bear-
ing in mind that it is incumbent upon the defendant to rebut 
the inference by showing that the injury in question oceurred 
without being proximately caused by any failure of duty on 
his part, or on the part of any of his agents or employees. 
"You are instru<.-ted that where an inference is permitted 
by law, that sueh inference is only a species of evidenee, and 
where sueh inference is rebutted by clear, positive and uncon-
tradicted evidence, then luch inference is dispelled and dis-
appears from the ease." Manifestly, the instruction was in 
square conflict with the instruction on e..~ert testimony and 
its effect would be erased from the minds of the jury. It would 
indicate to the jury that expert evidence was required under 
all circumstanees. 
In erlticizing the instruction on res ipsa loquitur offered by 
plaintiff (but refused) the majority states that it omitted the 
requirement of proximate cause. While such issue is not 
mentioned in the instruction, it M.d t&O pZace fhere, for it dealt 
solely with the evidence required to establish negligence. It 
was not a formula instruction. It reads: "In determining 
whether defendant's learning. skill and conduct· fulfilled the 
duties imposed on him by law, as they have been stated to 
I 
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you, you are not permitted to set up arhitl'arily II Rtandard 
of your own. The standard, I remind you. waR S(>t lip by the 
learning, skill Clnd care ordinarily possf'sseJ a III I Pl'lj('ti~E'd by 
othf'rs of the same profession in good .itunding in t he same 
locality at the same time. It follows. tht'refore. that except as 
hereinafter explained the only way you may properly learn 
that standard, is through evidence presented in this trial by 
physicians and sllrgeons calh;d as expert witnesses. 
"However. there is this exception to the rule just st.at('d: 
when it is a matter of common knowledge that dallger is 
involved in certain conditions or to take certain precautionary 
mf'8SlIreS, as, for instance, failure to perform the commonly 
known duties of cleanliness or sterilization, expert testimony is 
not required to establish such a fact, but it may bf' judicially 
notieed as a part of that fund of common knowledge shared by 
us with our fellow citizens generally. 
"This exception may bf' otherwise stated as follows: When 
it is common knowledge that an event or a circumstance that 
has happened to or developed in a patient is of the kind that 
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence on the 
part of the physician attending him, the question whethf'r 
or not the condition was caused by negligence may be decided 
from the general circumstances as shown by the evidence and 
in the light of common experience and reason." The subject 
of proximate cause was properly and adequately covered in 
other instructions. 
The majority opinion. in an endeavor to escape the holdings 
ill Barham v. Widing, 210 Cal. 206 [291 P. 173]. and other 
I'/lses cited in connection therewith, has this to say: "In the 
(,IISf'S cited where the doctrine was held applicable evidence 
flint the defendant did not cause the injury wa.~ remote Rnll 
it followed as a matter of common knowledge from thE.' na-
tllre of the injury that the result would not happen withont 
carl'lessness or negligence. In the present CRse the inferf'lwe 
thRt the injury was not caused by the defendant. but from 
some source theretofore exi!>tinll in the plaintiff's systt'm. I('n.~ 
1101 remote bllt could be rlrawn from substantial t'virlence in 
thf' rl'cord. Thf'refore tht' plaintiff has not necessarily hl'O!l!!'ht 
the injury home to the defp.ndant. Bl'fore the ('ompf'lJill!? 
inference based on common knowledge, which is at thE.' root of 
thf' res ipsa loquitur doctrine. would be justified it became 
necessary for the plaintiff to eliminate himself as a proximate 
CRUSf' of the injury." Thp pvic1pn<'e was not "remot.E.''' that 
the defendant did not cause thl' injury in the cited cases. In 
) 
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the Barham case Ihe defendant and hil "urlB IUlifled po,i-
tively that Ihe ",edl' was sterilized. The same is true of 
BeZlandi v. Park Sanitarium ABSn., 214 Cal. 472 [6 P.2d 508] ; 
Meyer v. McNutt Hospital, 173 Cal. 156 [159 P. 436] ; Dean 
v. Dyer, 64 Cal.App.2d 646 [149 P.2d 288J; and Mastro v. 
Kennedy, 57 Cal.App.2d 499 [134 P.2d 865]. If it is meant 
by the quoted statement that all the evidence must "neces-
sarily" show that defendant caused the injury, and that simi-
larly it must all show that some independt>nt phYlucal condi-
tion of plaintiff was not the cause, then we have some strange 
law on res ipsa loquitur. The fallacy of the reasoning is 
pointed out in Mastro v. Kennedy, .upra. There plaintiff suf-
fered an infection in the jaw after the dentist had removed 
a tooth, and in the process administered Il painkiller by 
hypodermic needle. The court there said: "We may also 
accept as established facts, that immediately after the ex-
traction there was no infection on the roots of the tooth nor 
in the sockets; that a serious infection set in which caused 
plaintiff much su1fering and expense over a period of two 
years. 
"The case of Barham v. Widing, 210 Cal. 206 [291P. 173], 
has features quite similar to those of the instant case. There, 
a dentist was accused of malpractice because be failed to 
sterilize the hypodermic needle used in injecting an anesthetic, 
and to sterilize the gums before extracting a tooth . . • I quot-
ing from Barham v. Widing, -FaJ : 'As the court says in 
the case of Dimock v. Miller, 202 Cal. 668, 671 [262 P. 311, 
312]: 
" , "If ... it is necessary to demonstrate conclusively 
and beyond the possibility of a doubt that the negligence re-
sulted in the injury, it would never be possible to recover in 
a case of negligence in the practice of a profession which is 
not an exact science." 
4' 'It is not necessary in the trial of civil cases that the cir-
eum.stances shall establish the negligence of the defendant as 
the proximate cause of injury with such absolute certainty 
as to exclude every other conclusion. It is sufficient if there 
is substantial evidence upon which to reasonably support the 
judjlment • • .' 
,. Defendants seek to distinguish the instant case from the 
Barham case, because there, the infection started from the 
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general locality but not ncceslinrily ill till' l'xact spot of the 
injel'tiolls. This distinction is too tpilllOtlS io be sUIIIHl. Here, 
the infection was in the region wlil're the lIt'l'dle piercetl the 
ullsterilized gums, and the reasollable illft'rence might [ollow, 
if drawn by the jury, that a germ on the unsterile gums was 
carried into the tissue all the needle and caused the infection. 
'l'l!e result of all ullsterile cOllditiou is a matter of common 
knowledge under the cases already cited. 
". . . 'rhe danger of infection from an unsterile instru-
ment, or a dirty field of operation, is a matter of such common 
. knowledge that a jury is authorized to draw the reasonable 
inference that an infection was caused by negligence where 
all unsterile instrument is used, or the operative field is 
not properly sterilized . . . [cases cited]. 
"In Roberts v. Parker, 121 Cal.App. 264 [8 P.2d 9081, 
a dentist was sued for malpractice where osteomyelitis of the 
jawbone set in after an operation where no X-ray had been 
taken to determine the condition of the field of operation. 
Experts testified that under the standards of good practice 
prevailing in the community an X-ray should have been taken 
before the tooth was extracted.. There was evidence intro-
duced on behalf of the defendant tending to prove that the 
disease had its source other than in the extraction of a tooth. 
It was argued that there was nothing to show that the failure 
to use due care on the part of the dentist was the proximate 
cause of the osteomyelitis. In disposing of this argument 
t he court said: 
" 'Therefore, if in spite of the testimony tending to show 
a different origin of the disease there be testimony to sustain 
the opposite conclusion which has been reached by the jury, 
its verdict must be sustained. In other words after the verdict 
of the jury has been fairly rendered, all the circumstances 
of the case, together with any reasonable inference which 
may be drawn therefrom, will be marshaled in support of 
the judgment. (Barham v. Widing, supra.) Measured by 
the foregoing rules the circumstances of the present casc are 
legally sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. (Dimock v. 
Miller, sltpra; Barham v. Widing, supra; Ley v. BisJlOpp, 
supra.)' " 
There is clearly no basis for a distinction between the 
case at bar and Barham v. lfiding, supra, so far as the appli-
cability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is concerned, and 
the attemptcu distinc~tion in thr majority opinion will not 
stand t.he test of intelligent Ilnuiasecl serutiny. If this doc-
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trine is applicable to this case, then there can be no question 
but that the jury was erroneously instructed. and that sucb 
error was prejudicial to plaintiff. 
I would, therefore, nverse the judgment. 
TRAYNOR, J. t Dissenting.-I cannot agree that it was not 
prejudicially erroneous for the trial court to limit the testi-
mony of plaintiff's only expert witness. In a field of law in 
which expert testimony is essential, the rulings below deprived 
plaintiff of a fair opportunity to prove the allegations of his 
complaint. 
It was necessary for plaintiff to establish by competent evi-
dence that (1) the infection was centered in the genito-urinary 
tract, (2) there was no infection, latent or chronic, when de-
fendant made the examination, and that (3). the infection was· 
caused by defendant's failure to exercise due care in the 
conduct of the examination, particularly in the sterilization 
of the instruments used. 
Plaintiff does not dispute that there was no direct evidence 
tending to establish that defendant was negligent. It WIUI 
not essential that he produce such evidence. Upon proof 
that the infection originated in the area examined and that 
it was not present before the examination, the jury ('ould 
reasonably infer that the infection was introduced by the 
examination and therefore caused by the negligence of the 
defendant. It is common knowledge that infections do not 
ordinarily occur during medical treatment unless there is 
negligence. (Barham v. Widing, 210 Cal. 206, 216 [291 P. 
1731.) If the plaintiff establishes by expert testimony that 
his infection arose during medieaI treatment and that it would 
not ordinarily arise in the absence of negligent treatment, 
the jury may infer negligence on the basis of res ipsa loquitur. 
(Sins v. Owens, 33 Oal.2d 749, 753 [205 P.2d 31; Bcllandi 
v. Park Sanitarium Asm., 214 Cal. 472, 480 [6 P.2d 5081; 
Barham v. Widing, supra.) 
Plaintiff could rely upon res ipsa loquitur, however, only 
if he established by expert testimony the first two elements 
of his case, the location of the infection and the nature of 
its origin, which are not matters of common knowledge. (Per-
kins v. Trueblood, 180 Oal. 437 (181 P. 6421 ; Sim v. Weeks, 7 
Oal.App.2d 28 [45 P.2d 350]; Slimak v. I<'Qster, 106 Oonn. 
366 [138 A. 153] j ahride v. Callahan, 124 F.2d 825; see eases 
collected in 141 A.L.R. 5-50.) 
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Plaintiff introduced the testimony of Dr. Frank Webb. 
After plaintiff's counsel had iriterrogated Dr. Webb about 
his educational back~roulld and professional experience de-
fense counsel raised doubts as to the witness's qualifications. 
The trial court permitted Dr. Webb to answer only one hypo-
thetical question based on evidence before the court. He was 
not permitted to testify about his experience with diseases and 
infe('tions of the genito-urinary tract, although the offer of 
pl'oof in chambers indicated that he had considerable knowl-
edge thereof. Plaintiff's counsel made it clear that "we are 
not asking the witness to testify as to the procedure that was 
uS<:'d. Weare asking him to testify as to the cause and 
nat ure of this infection." The trial court nonetheless re-
fused to permit any furtht>r questioning about the location 
and nature of the infection upon defense counsel's objection 
that the witness was not an expert in the performance of 
cystoscopic examinations and Ilaci not seen one performed 
in Los Angeles in 1944. This ruling precluded the witness 
from testifying that the infection was not caused by a septic 
condition in the tl'act at the time of the examination and 
that the condition was not a local or systemic one originating 
bt'fore the examination. Plaintiff's case depended upon his 
ability to disprove thosepossibiIities. 
During the course of his examination, the witness stated 
that he assumed the examination had been competently con-
dul'feci. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked the 
witlless: 
"Q Doctor, from the hypothetil'al question that was pro-
pounded to you you assumed that the cystoscopic examination 
was made very competently and very thoroughly, did you not f 
.• A. ManipUlation of the instruments or manual-what 
I mean to say is that the instruments or the manual manipu-
lation of them was evidently very good . 
.. MR. STERRY'l defense counsel): I move that the answer 
be stricken as not responsive to the question. 
"\VilJ you read the que!it inn 1 
.. ('1'he reporter reads the last question.) 
"A. I assumed that--
"Q. Will you just answer that yes or no, doctor' 
"A. I can answer that yes. . 
"MR. STERRY: That is all." 
On redirect examination, plaintiff's counsel asked Dr. Webb 
hew he would explain his answer. Upon objection, the court 
refUsed to permit an answer to the question on the ground 
j 
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11Iat there was no ambiguity in defense counsel'. question 
. Dr in the witneas's answer. The record does not 81JStain 
~at holding. From the offer of proof in chambers, it ap-
pears that Dr. Webb meant to testify only that the actual 
physical conduct of the examination was competent. Be did 
Dot intend by that statement to express an opinion about 
the sterilization technique before the examination. Since he 
was not permitted to make that explanation, the jury was 
left with the impression that plainti1f's only expert witness 
approved defendant's conduct of the examination in all ita 
phases. The prejudicial effect of' the trial court's ruling is 
readily apparent. It has beeD repeatedly held that the refuaaJ 
of a trial court to permit the witness to explain a yes or no 
answer is reversible error. (McGuire v. BtJird, 9 Cal.2d 353, 
355.356 [70 P.2d 915]; Webber v. Pork Auto TromporioRota 
00.,138 Wash. 325 [244 P. 718] ; 58 Am.Jur. 321.) 
The trial court refused to permit the plainti1f'. witness 
to answer more than a single hypothetical question and ex-
pressed doubt as to his competence to testify at all. The ap-
proval of that ruling by the majority opinion throws an 
overwhelming burden of proof on the plainti1f in malpractice 
eases. The majority opinion states that the exclusion of Dr. 
Webb's testimony was not erroneous for the reason that "A 
medical expert is not qualified as a witness unless he is shown 
not only to have the required professional knowledge, learn-
ing and skill to express his opinion, but is also familiar with 
the standards required of physicians under similar circum-
stances. " This statement and the eases cited in ita support 
are inapplicable to the present case. It may be conceded that 
a medical expert called to testify that a defendant did not 
exercise that degree of care and skill ordinarily exercised 
by members of the profession under similar circumstances 
must be familiar with the standard of care prevalent among 
the members of the profession. A medical practitioner who 
testifies as to the standard of care ordinarily exercised by a 
.pecialist in a given ease must either be a specialist himself 
or must show familiarity with the methods of such specialists. 
(McGuire v. Boird, 9 Cal.2d 353, 356 [70 P.2d 915]; 8iu v. 
Owens,33 Cal.2d 749, 753 [205 P.2d 8].) Dr. Webb, however, 
did not ., testify to the degree of care against which the treat-
ment given is to be measured." (8inz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d 
749, 753 [205 P.2d 3].) He was called to testify solely as to 
the location and nature of the infection, matters within the 
I 
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province of any competent medical practitioner. His degree 
of familiarity with cystoscopy technique and the conduct of 
cystoscopic examinations is irrelevant, for he was not called 
to testify about the technique or the standard of conduct of 
the examination. "The law does not require the best possible 
kiJid of a witness, but only persons of such qualifications as 
the community daily and reasonably relies upon in seeking 
medical advice ... the ordinary medical practitioner should 
be received on all matters as to which a regular medical 
training necessarily involves some general knowledge." 
(2 Wigmore, Evidence, § 569, p. 665.) When the subject of 
inquiry is not the required standard of care but the nature 
of an ailment or its location, "a physician of practice and 
experience is an expert and . . . it is not necessary that a 
witness of this class should have made the particular disease 
involved in any inquiry a specialty in order to make his tes-
timony admissible as an expert." (Drucker v. Philadelphia 
Dairy Products Co., Inc., 35 Del. 437, 441 [166 A. 796]; 
Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hospital, 285 N.Y. 389, 398 
[34 N.E.2d 367] ; Johnson v. Winston, 68 Neb. 425, 430 [94 
N.W. 607] ; Young v. Stevens, 132 N.J.L. 124, 126 [39 A.2d 
115) ; Hathaway's Administrator v. National Life Insurance 
Co., 48 Vt. 335, 351; Swanson v. Hood, 99 Wash. 506, 515, 516 
[170 P. 135].) 
The testimony that plaintiff's witness was allowed to present 
demonstrates that he is a competent practicing physician 
familiar with general medical practice, that he has kept abreast 
of the latest developments by research and study, and that 
he has had experience with diseases and infections of the 
genito-urinary tract. Treatment of infections and knowledge 
of their nature, cause, and effect, are the stock in trade of 
the practicing physician. The growth of specialization does 
not disqualify a general practitioner from signalizing the 
existence of an infection in a patient's body merely becausl' 
he is not a specialist on that part of the body where the in· 
fection exists. The trial court, therefore, committed error 
in holding that Dr. Webb was not qualified to testify as to 
the location of plaintiff's infection and to its probable time 
of origin. 
The majority opinion holds that even if it were error to 
exclude Dr. Webb's testimony, it would not be prejuuicial 
since Dr. Webb testified in reply to the one question he was 
permitted to answer over defeIHlallt's objection that he be-
lieved the infection was carried into tIll: urinary tract by the 
